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LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND BRITAIN - A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
DAVID R. LowRY*
ANTHONY F. BARTLrr**
TIMOTHY J. HEnsz***
As advanced industrial nations, both the United States
and Britain shared many problems in the formation of their
industrial relations systems. These problems included the
right of unions to recognition by employers, the right to bargain collectively, the exercising of industrial sanctions by both
unions and employers and the role of government in regulating
the interaction of the parties with collective bargaining in order to protect the public interest.
What they do not share, however, are the responses of the
law in both countries to the needs of sophisticated industrial
relations structures. In the formative stages of both industrial
relations systems judicial responses to trade unionism were
fairly similar in that judges were, in general, hostile to the
objectives of unions and supportive of employers.' Judicial
hostility to unions, however, continued for a much longer period in Britain than in the United States. Starting from the
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latter part of the nineteenth century in Britain and the early
part of the twentieth century in America, legislative interven-2
tion tended to be supportive of the objectives of unionism.
But where the American legislative approach favored sweeping, comprehensive reform, 3 the British approach was to address specific problems. in a piecemeal manner,4 reflecting,
perhaps, the British propensity for immediate compromise
rather than for long-range planning.
In comparison with Britain, the United States enjoys a relatively stable and rational industrial relations system. This
comparative tranquility prompted the British Parliament to
attempt comprehensive reform of its own system with the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, 5 modeled largely on America's
labor law. This attempt proved a total failure and the Act was
repealed in 1974.6 The legislation which replaced it 7 consequently reflects more of the particular problems of Britain,
but it does not compare with the better example set by the
United States. Nonetheless, it is clear that some major overhaul of the British system is necessary and while the Parliament of that country may today look more toward0 Europe
than to America for alternatives,8 these writers contend that
there is much in the American system which might be profitably emulated in Britain. This article will examine the differing
historical, social and political forces in both countries which
serve to make extensive transplantation from the American to
the British system difficult, if not improbable. It will also examine the effect that these differences have had on the present-day industrial relations structures of both countries, together with some proposals for the reform of the British
system based on the American experience.

I. FORMATIVE TRADE UNIONISM AND THE LAW
In the young American republic, early union organizing ef2. See E. BROWN, THE GROWTH OF BRTSH INDusTRIAL RELATIONS 175-90 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as E. BROWN] and, in America, M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR
LAW 517-23 (2d ed. 1965).
3. C. GREGORY, LABOR AND

223 (1946) [hereinafter oited as C. GREGORY].
HEPPLE & P. O'HIGGINS, EMPLoYMENT LAW
3-39 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as B. HEPPLE & P. O'HIGINS].
THE LAW

4. For legislative developments, see B.

5. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, c. 72 (repealed 1974).
6. Professor K. Wedderbum termed the industrial and political upheaval caused
by the Act the "government's Industrial Vietnam," The Observer, April 1, 1973, at 1.
7. Trade Union and Labor Relations Act, 1974, c. 52, § 1.
8. B. HEPPLE & P. O'HIGGINS, supra note 4, at 261-74.
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forts were hindered by the application of the criminal conspiracy doctrine. The Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case in 18061
held that a combination to raise wages or one that required
others to join a union was actionable as a criminal conspiracy.
Thus, the very existence of a union, let alone its activities, was
placed in jeopardy by law. Conspiracy actions against the
fledgling unions continued,"0 although application of the doctrine was eased somewhat with the Commonwealth v. Hunt
decision of 1842." In Hunt, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
found that the objectives of a union, or the means *used to
reach them, must be unlawful in themselves in okder to establish the crime of conspiracy.
In England, the use of the doctrine of conspiracy against
combinations of workmen began as early as 172112 when journeymen tailors in Cambridge joined forces and refused to work
for less than a set wage; this action rendered them guilty of
conspiracy. Thereafter, English courts readily applied the conspiracy doctrine against combinations of workmen, although
there was no objection at common law to an individual worker
bargaining with his employer on his own, or to his refusing to
work. 3 From the outset, then, the common law was too narrow
in scope to be of any use in the development of unions: "The
important point about common-law conspiracy independent of
any breach of statute where it aims to do no other act unlawful in itself, is, of course, that the illegality rests upon the
judge's disapproval of the combination alone."' 4
In addition to common-law conspiracy, English workmen
were also subject to a series of anticombination acts which
were first enacted in the fourteenth century.15 Some of these
9. Philadelphia Cordwainers Case (Pa. 1806), reported in 3 COMMONS & GmmoRE,
DocUmFaNARY HISTORY OF AmmcAN INDusTRmI
10. C. GREGORY, supra note 3, at 25.

11.
12.
13.
14.

SocIwrY 59-248 (1910-11).

47 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
Rex v.Joumeymen-Taylors of Cambridge, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (1721).
C. GREGORY, supra note 3, at 19.
K. WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW 306 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter

cited as K.

WEDDERBURN].

15. See, e.g., Statutum de Conspiratoribus, 1293, 21 Edw. 1; Ordinance of
Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 1; 7 Rich. 2, c. 5 (1383); 11 Hen. 7, c. 2 (1494); Bill of
Conspiracies of Victuallers and Craftsmen, 1548, 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 15; Statute of Artificiers, 1562, 5 Eliz., c. 4; London Tailors, 1720, 7 Geo. 1, c. 13; Woolen Weavers,
1725, 12 Geo. 1, c. 34; Hatters, 1749, 22 Geo. 2, c. 27; Combinations of Spitalfield
Weavers, 1773, 13 Geo. 3, c. 68; Combinations in Paper Manufacture, 1796, 36 Geo. 3,
c. 111.
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were general in application, while others were addressed to
specific trades. The Combination Acts of 1799-18001 were
passed at a time when the British Parliament was fearful of
any mass gatherings among the populace. Just a decade earlier they had witnessed the French Revolution, with its attendant excesses. Also, closer to home than the continental
Jacobin uprising, were the mutiny of the British fleet at the
Nore in 1797, and in 1798 the uprising of the United Irishmen.
These occurrences were enough in themselves to make any
government of privileged classes uneasy. With the increasing
growth of the factory system, however, and the large numbers
of workers crowding into the towns and cities, the government
and the courts felt compelled to deal harshly with worker combinations in order to ensure that the potential bargaining
strength which workers had was not realized or, if realized,
was illegal to act upon.'7 These Acts were so broadly drafted
that they could have theoretically applied to price-fixing combinations of employers, but in practice they were used almost
exclusively against the workers.'" Workers engaging in collective opposition were punished for the slightest infringement.
Thus, a bootmaker, in concert with six others, who stopped
work in order to protest the employers' action of halving wages
was prosecuted under the Acts; all seven were sentenced to
fourteen days imprisonment with hard labor.'9 Francis Place, a
master tailor, fought hard and skillfully for repeal of the Acts.
He was very profidient at collecting evidence to prove his arguments and seeing to it that it was received in the right
16. 39 Geo. 3, c. 81 (1799); 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 106 (1800).
17. CARTER & MEAus, A HISTORY OF GREAT BRrrAN FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 697 (1937) [hereinafter cited as CARTER & MEAs]:
Two ideas inspired this legislation. First, workmen's unions were regarded
as a political danger, for the government was still nervous of Jacobins. Secondly - Parliament considered that the masters of industry must be given a
free hand and therefore that their workmen ought not to combine against them.
18. E. BROWN, supra note 2, at 178:
"The wisdom and humanity of Parliament," a Committee reported to the
House in 1806, "would shrink from sanctioning the Combination Law if it appeared to them, at the time of the enactment, likely to operate only in favor of
the strong against the weak: if it had any apparent tendency to secure impunity to oppressors, and to give undue advantage to the masters who can combine with little danger of detection, and who can carry their projects into execution with little fear of opposition."
19. CARTER & MEAns, supra note 17, at 794.
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quarters. He and his friend Hume, a radical member of Parliament, succeeded in getting sufficient parliamentary support to
secure the passage of legislation repealing the Combination
Acts of 1799-1800.2o
The pent-up resentment of English workers burst forth
with repeal of the Acts in 1824,21 causing a wave of strikes,
many violent, over the entire country. An alarmed Parliament
then passed an act in 182 5 2 which expressly legalized certain
combinations, and at the same time made the exercise of
union functions mote difficult. Section 3 21 of the Act established a number of loosely defined criminal offenses, dealing
with the violence brought about through the pressures of industrial conflict. These were "threats," "molestation," "intimidation," and "obstruction." The judiciary, in general, did not
try to confine the application of these offenses to circumstances involving violence, but sought instead to broaden the
definitions to encompass most instances that today would be
considered legitimate union activities.24 A mere threat to

'
strike, for example, was considered to be "molestation."
Judicial ingenuity in restricting union activities was by no
means exhausted in this period, as evidenced by the case of

20. Combination Laws Repeal Act, 1824, 5 Geo. 4, c. 95.
21. H. PELLING, A HISTORY OF BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM 30 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as H. PELLING].
22. Combination Act, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, c. 129.
23. Section 3 provided in pertinent part that:
[I]f
any Person shall by Violence to the Person or Property, or by Threats or
Intimidation, or by molesting or in any way obstructing another, force or endeavor to force any Journeyman, Manufacturer, Workman or other Person
hired or employed in any Manufacture, Trade or Business, to depart from his
Hiring, Employment or Work, or to return his Work before the same shall be
finished, or prevent or endeavor to prevent any Journeyman, Manufacturer or
other Person not being hired or employed from hiring himself to, or from accepting Work or Employment from any Person or Persons; or if any Person
shall use or employ Violence to the Person or Property of another, or Threats or
Intimidation, or shall molest or in any way obstruct another for the Purpose of
forcing or inducing such Person to belong to any Club or Association, . . . or if
any Person shall by Violence to the Person or Property or Business, or by
Threats or Intimidation, or by molesting or in any way obstructing another,
force or endeavor to force any Manufacturer or Person carrying on any Trade or
Business, . . . every Person so offending or aiding, abetting or assisting therein,
being imprisoned and kept to Hard Labour, for any Time not exceeding Three
Calendar Months.
24. C. GREGORY, supra note 3, at 20-22.
25. H. PEL.ING, supra note 21, at 31.
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the Tolpuddle Martyrs,2" a case whose infamy has passed into
British trade union folklore. Six men from the village of
Tolpuddle in Dorset, England, were arrested in 1834 for the
offense of taking the oath of their union. Even though joining
a union was no longer unlawful because of the repeal of the
Combination Acts, a leap of the judicial imagination equated
the administration of union oaths with the kind of activity associated with a naval mutiny. The unfortunate six were sentenced to seven years transportation and hard labor in Australia by ingenious use of the Unlawful Oaths Act of 1797,7 which
was passed after the major naval mutiny at the Nore. After
serving four years of their sentence, and following a campaign
of widespread indignation and protest on the part of both labor and the liberal establishment, they were released. 28
The objectives of a trade union could also render them in
"restraint of trade" at common law. 9 Some judges in the nineteenth century even thought that the existence of any association in restraint of trade was criminally "indictable at common law as tending to impede and interfere with the free
course of trade."30 This same restraint of trade doctrine deprived unions of any lawful civil status.
It became clear that the common law held little hope for
the development of the growing union movement. Statutory
law promised some relief with the Trade Union Act of 1871.1'
This statute was passed by a legislature which had become
more responsive to the needs of urban workers after the exten-

26. Id. at 41.
27. 37 Geo. 3, c. 123 (1796). In this period of labor history joining a union often
involved elaborate rituals designed to stress the need for secrecy. Prior to repeal of the
Combination Acts in 1824, and even after repeal, the rituals survived as a tradition;
skeletons, masks and robes being used in the ceremonies - see B. COOPER & A. BARTL-r, INDUsTRIAL RELA7roNs - A STuDY iN CONFLCT 36 (1976) [hereinafter cited as B.
CooPER & A. BARTLrr].
28. H. PE ING, supra note 21, at 42.
29. See Hilton v. Eckersley, 119 Eng. Rep. 781 (1855), per Campbell L.C.J., at
789, where he noted that the upholding of the union agreement:
would establish a principle upon which the fantastic and mischievous notion of
a "Labour Parliament" might be realized for regulating the wages and the
hours of labour in every branch of trade all over the empire. The most disastrous consequences would follow to masters and to men, and to the whole
community.
30. K. WEDDERBURN, supra note 14, at 313.
31. 34 & 35 Vict., c. 31 (1871).
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3ion of the franchise in 1867.2 Section 2 of the Act stated that
the purposes of a trade union should not render any member
liable to criminal prosecution merely because they were in restraint of trade. Also, the Criminal Law Amendment Act,
18 7 1,3 restricted the definitions of "threats" and "intimidations," making a mere threat to strike no longer a statutory
offense. But these protections proved illusory, for in 1872 Mr.
Justice Brett held in Regina v. Bunn 4 that the common law
had not been abrogated by the 1871 Act. A threat to strike by
London gas workers to secure reinstatement of a fellow worker
discharged for union activity resulted in their prosecution for
criminal conspiracy and in a sentence of twelve months' imprisonment. This decision instigated the appointment of a
Royal Commission in 1874, whose report resulted in the Conspiracy and Protections of Property Act, 1875.3 Section 3 of
the Act provided that an agreement or combination by two or
more persons to do or procure to be done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute should not be actionable as a conspiracy if such act, when committed by one person, would not be punishable as a crime. This major turning
point in British labor law finally established the right of trade
unionists to engage in union activities without the taint of
criminal conspiracy. However, a strong aversion to the courts
had been built up in the attitudes of most British union leaders by this time, an aversion which has persisted to this day:
In 1800 trade unions were utterly illegal. The fact remains
today a critical feature of their legal situation. The explanation of this paradox will provide us with the key to the peculiar structure of our law, concerning trade unions and industrial conflict. The most powerful influence on that law...
has been the union's struggle to emerge from that illegality."
JUDICIAL CIRCUMVENTION OF PRO-UNION LEGISLATION
Judicial hostility in the United States to the activities of
unions was evident in the issuance of injunctions to prevent
H1.

32. J. GPmFrrH, THE PouTcS OF THE JUDIcIARY 57 (1977) [hereinafter cited as J.
GmRrMl]. 3
33. 34 & 35 Vict., c. 32 (1871).
34. 12 Cox 316 (1872).
35. 38 & 39 Vict., c. 86 (1875).
36. K. WEDDERBURN, supra note 14, at 304.
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strikes, picketing and boycotts.3 7 There was also judicial support for the "yellow dog contract," which was an agreement
signed by a worker as a condition of employment that he
would not join a union or engage in union activities under pain
of forfeiture of his employment..3 8 Injunctions had been issued
freely by the state courts in labor disputes toward the end of
the nineteenth century, 9 but this anti-union utilization of a
remedy which should have been extraordinary in labor-management disputes, received its greatest boost when the federal
government obtained an injunction to end the Pullman strike
in 1894."o This abuse of injunctive relief continued in both federal and state courts until the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 1932, 41 which provided that injunctions could only be
42
issued in labor disputes under very stringent circumstances.
"Yellow dog contracts" had been used with devastating effect against union organizing efforts, and various state legisla37. C. GREGORY, supra note 3, at 83-104. "We especially object to government by
injunction as a new and highly dangerous form of oppression by which Federal
Judges, in contempt of the laws of the States and rights of citizens, become at once
legislators, judges and executioners." Id. at 83 (Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1896).
38. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); H. WELLINGTON,
LABOR AND THE LEGAL PRocEss 26 (1968) [hereinafter cited as H. WELLINGTON].

39. H. WELIANGTON, supra note 38, at 39.
40. S. LENs, THE LABOR WARS, 89-121 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. LENs].
The application for an injunction was immediately granted by federal
judges Peter S. Grosscup - who a few weeks before had stated that "the
growth of labor organizations must be checked by law" - and William A.
Woods - who was much beholden to the railroads for past favors. Without
hearing a single witness on the union's side, and solely on the basis of "information and belief" affidavits by the government, offered without proof, the two
jurists outlawed the great Pullman strike, and placed 150,000 workers at the
mercy of their employers.
Id. at 114.
41. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 10115 (1976)); see also H. WELLINGTON, supra note 38, at 39:
Injunctions were often issued by trial courts, on the basis of affidavits, in ex
parte proceedings. Indeed, in the 118 labor injunction cases reported in the federal courts from 1901 to 1928, 70 ex parte restraining orders were granted without notice to the defendants or opportunity to be heard. And, because unions
were weak, it was the trial court's ex parteinjunction that usually disposed of a
case.
42. For a more recent analysis of the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) and
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
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tures enacted laws prohibiting their use.4 3 Congress sought to
ban their use by interstate carriers in the Erdman Act, 1898,"
but such attempts were consistently declared invalid by the
Supreme Court.45 The climate of opinion, however, continued
to militate against their use and they were expressly banned
by the Railway Labor Act, 1926,46 and rendered unenforceable
in federal courts by the Norris-LaGuardia Act."
Judicial inventiveness was further illustrated by use of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 1890,11 against unions. This Act "addressed itself to "combinations in restraint of trade" and "attempts to monopolize trade," giving the Supreme Court sufficient leeway to apply its provisions against such union
industrial sanctions as the boycott. 9 The Sherman Act was
subsequently amended by the Clayton Act, 1914,50 which
sought, inter alia, to relieve unions of this judicially imposed
liability. The courts were quick to circumvent the Clayton
Act, however, holding that the protection accorded a union's
"existence and operation" 5' did not extend to certain union ac43. C. GREGORY, supra note 3, at 174-84.
44. Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898).
45. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
46. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1926). In Texas & New Orleans Plywood Co. v. Brotherhood
of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) the Supreme Court distinguished the Adair
and Coppage cases by pointing out that the Railway Labor Act did not interfere with
the right of the employer to select and discharge employees but was aimed rather at
protection of the right of employees to have representatives of their own choosing.
47. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 99 10115 (1976)) outlawing the "yellow dog contract" in ch. 90, § 3 (29 U.S.C. § 103).
48. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (1976)).
49. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
50. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified in scattered sections of 15,
28, 29 U.S.C. (1976)).
51. Id. ch. 323, § 6 (15 U.S.C. § 17):
[T]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, Instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor
shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust
laws.
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tivities.5 2 Thus, judges in both countries seemed to display an
extraordinary ability to apply the law against trade unions
even when laws were passed with the express object of protecting unions from judge-imposed liabilities.
The process of judicial circumvention also continued in
Britain during this period. According to the House of Lords,
the protection accorded to unions from charges of criminal
conspiracy at common law, provided by the Conspiracy and
Protection of Property Act of 1875, did not extend to actions
for civil conspiracy. " Adding to the travails of British unions
was the Taff Vale decision in 1901.11 There the court held that
trade unions could be sued in their registered names for actions in tort and that liabilities so incurred could be satisfied
from union funds. Prior to this decision, union leaders felt that
they were adequately protected financially as they were not
corporations, nor had the Trade Unions Act, 1871, conferred
corporate status upon them. Justice Farwell, however, found
no difficulty in overturning the argument concerning a union's
unincorporated status. The learned judge observed that the
privileges conferred upon trade unions by the Trade Union
Act, 1871, implied a correlative liability on the part of a union
to be sued in its own name for any tortious acts committed on
its behalf. 5 Professor Wedderburn recently characterized this
decision:

52. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
53. Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A.C. 495.
54. Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426
(H.L.).
55. Id. at 429:
Now, although a corporation and an individual or individuals may be the only
entity known to the common law who can sue or be sued, it is competent to the
legislature to give to an association of individuals which is neither a corporation nor a partnership nor an individual a capacity for owning property and
acting by agents, and such capacity in the absence of express enactment to the
contrary involves the necessary correlative of liability to the extent of such
property for the acts and defaults of such agents. It is beside the mark to say of
such an association that it is unknown to the common law.
The finding of Farwell, J., was reversed in the Court of Appeal but later affirmed by
the House of Lords, the Earl of Halsbury, L.C., observing, at 436:
If the Legislature has created a thing which can own property, which can employ servants, and which can inflict injury, it must be taken, I think, to have
impliedly given the power to make it suable in a Court of Law for injuries
purposely done by its authority and procurement.
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Nothing did more to embitter relations between the courts
and the workers than the Law Lords' decision that a registered union could after all be sued. . . . The Taff Vale case
became part of working class culture, part of the way "they"
treat trade unions if they can. Such feelings have not died."'
Trade unionists throughout the entire country expressed
great alarm at this decision. Unrest became widespread, and
presspre from trade unions and concerned liberals mounted
upon Parliament for statutory intervention. The Liberal Party
won the general election in 1906 and, in the same year, the
Trade Disputes Act" was passed. The Act was a response to
the Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Disputes and
Trade Combinations; under the chairmanship of Lord Dunedin.5 s The Commission highlighted the need for legislative action on both the Taft Vale "9 case and the question of union
liability for civil conspiracy. Section 1 of the Act provided that
an act done by two or more persons in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute should not be actionable unless the
same act, done without any such agreement or combination,
would be actionable. Section 3 provided that any act performed by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute should not be actionable on the ground only that it
induced another person to break a contract of employment.
Thus union officials or stewards who called a strike and actually induced a breach of contract could not be proceeded
against at law because the Act gave an "immunity" to such
activities. The wording of section 3, however, gave protection
to the inducement only; the words "on the ground only" precluded the use of unlawful means such as violence or threats
to procure the inducement. This sting in the tail of the 1906
Act was to be revealed much later. The Taft Vale situation
was covered by section 4 of the Act, which ensured that an
action against a trade union or against any members or officials of such unions in respect to tortious acts alleged to have
been committed by or on behalf of the union, would not be
56. K. WEDDERBURN, supra note 14, at 1317.
57. 6 Edw. 7, c. 47 (1906).
58. Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Trade Disputes and Trade
Combinations, (Cd. 2826 of 1906) majority report.
59. Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [19011 A.C. 426
(H.L.).
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entertained by the courts. But section 4 did not protect union
officials and union members from proceeding as individuals.
Consequently, after 1906, in actions against their officials,
most unions continued to back their people financially when
the act complained of occurred in the course of union
business."
III.

MAJOR

STATUTORY UNDERPINNINGS IN THE UNITED STATES

The main problem facing American unions in the postWorld War I period was the struggle for recognition by employees.6 ' Employers used various means to keep their employee relations from being interfered with by institutions they
considered alien to their own particular enterprises, i.e., unions.6" Among their more important weapons were the establishment of company unions (unions established, controlled or
dominated by employers) and the use of discrimination
against workers who joined unions or engaged in union activity.613 It should be noted here that the Norris-LaGuardia Act 64
merely made "yellow dog contracts" unenforceable, not illegal. In addition, the protection accorded workers by the Railway Labor Act of 19265 applied initially only to railroads.
What was needed was an act to. cover interstate commerce
generally. This requirement was met with the passage of the
Wagner Act in 1935.66 Among the more important measures
the Wagner Act secured for employees were the legal right to
organize, to engage in organizing activities and to bargain collectively through chosen representatives." It also established a
60. H. PELLING, supra note 21 at 123-39.
61. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW § 1, at 209 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
R. GORMAN].
62. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE

(1919), at 82: "No employer should be required to deal with men or groups of men
who are not his employees or chosen from among them."
63. R. GORMAN, supra note 61, at 195.
64. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 10115 (1976)).
65. Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (codified in scattered sections
of 28, 45 U.S.C. (1976)).
66. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976)).
67. Id. at ch. 372, § 7 (29 U.S.C. § 157): "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
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list of unfair labor practices which could be levelled against
employers.'s
The Wagner Act was passed at a time when collective bargaining forces tended to favor employers. " It was deemed appropriate and necessary to redress this bargaining imbalance
in the 1930's, but over the years the Act received the continued criticism that its provisions were considered to be too
heavily weighted in the union's favor.70 The problems of reconstruction in the period immediately following the Second
World War led to a great deal of industrial unrest and conflict.7 Public concern about the activities of unions in this period led eventually to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947.7 This Act sought to meet many of the criticisms levelled
at the Wagner Act and it established a list of unfair labor
practices 7" which employers could use against unions, thus
seeking to equalize their respective collective bargaining positions in the eyes of the law. Thereafter, the report of the Mcties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
68. Id. at ch. 372, § 8 (29 U.S.C. § 158). For an appreciation of the Wagner Act's
impact on union organizing and collective bargaining see Taft, Organized Labor and
the New Deal (1942), reproduced in R. RowAN, READINGS IN LABOR ECONOMICS AND
LABOR RELATIONS 3 (3d ed. 1976).
69. R. GORMAN, supra note 61, at 1-6.
70. W. OBERER & K. HANsIowE, LABOR LAW 149 (1972):
First, the Act was criticized for its one-sidedness. It protected only employees, and through them their unions; it placed restraints only upon employers.
The interests claimed to have been neglected were principally those of employers and of the public, although complaint was also made that big, strong, unregulated unions on occasion dealt perversely with individual and minority employee interests. Second, it was charged that this one-sided statute was
administered in an overzealous fashion. The NLRB and its staff in Washington
and the regional offices around the country, were inveighed against as missionaries of faith not entirely the creation of Congress - collective bargaining the
message and evangelism the mood.
71. Goldberg, The Law and Practicesof Collective Bargaining,from FEDERAL POLICIES AND WORKER STATUS SINCE THE TITIEs 27-28:
With the end of the war, there was uncertainty over production cutbacks, with
fears of recession and unemployment as had occurred at the end of the first
World War. Furthermore, with earnings reduced by cutbacks in work-hours
and rising prices, the pressures for substantial increases were great. There was
substantial and widespread strike activity in the reconversion period, which
demonstrated the strength and lasting power of the unions, unlike the postWorld War I reconversion period.
72. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 29, 50 U.S.C. (1976)).
73. Id. at ch. 120, § 8(b) (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)).
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Clellan Committee 74 indicated the existence of widespread corruption and the abuse of basic democratic rights on the part of
union members in the internal affairs of some major unions.
The final result was the Landrum-Griffin Act, 1959, 75 which
primarily addressed the problems of corruption within union
leadership. The British were to wait many more years before
even attempting major comprehensive reforms of the kind that
had taken place in the United States.
IV. THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM IN BRITAIN
For some years after the passage of the Trade Disputes
Act, 1906, the British statutory underpinning seemed well established and promised some protection for unions from judicial interference in their functions. Their long struggle against
illegality had resulted in statutory recognition of their right to
exist, security of their funds and protection for their basic
functions. Some judges even propounded decisions in their
favor; Lord Wright, for example, noting in the 1942 Crofters'
case:76 "Where the rights of labour are concerned, the rights of
the employer are conditioned by the rights of the men to give
or withhold their services. The right of workmen to strike is an
77
essential element in the principle of collective bargaining."
Then, virtually out of nowhere, came the Rookes v. Barnard decision, 78 in 1964. The House of Lords held that a threat
by persons that employment contracts would be broken unless
the employer conceded to their demands, was a threat to do
something unlawful and constituted the tort of "intimidation." Thus, persons sued for civil conspiracy could not rely on
the protection afforded by the Trade Disputes Act, 1906.11 Although calling workers out on strike was still not illegal even
though it was inducing a breach of contract, the question concerning the offering of a threat to induce a breach, e.g., a
strike threat, remained for the Law Lords to ponder. While in
74. See J.

McCLELLAN, CRIME WITHouT PUNISHMENT

(1962).

75. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
73 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976)).
76. Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch, [1942]. A.C. 435.
77. Id. at 463.
78. [1964] A.C. 1129.
79. 6 Edw. 7, c. 48, § 1.
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the 1901 Taft Vale8" case the Lords were willing to "imply" a
quasi-corporate status to unions in order to attack their funds,
in the Rookes v. Barnard case in the 1960's, they were unwilling to imply a protection for the offering of a strike threat,
where clearly Parliament had expressly protected the act of
inducing a strike. Earlier, in the Court of Appeals, Lord Justice Donovan noted the absurdity of such a finding:
If that be that true position, as I think it is, then the situation is reached . .. that a strike is not unlawful, but the
threat to do so is. In other words, the policy which workmen
should pursue in order to avoid liability is to strike first and
negotiate afterwardg.'
The House of Lords affirmed the trial court's findings, and
their decision rocked the British trade union movement to its
foundations, as seriously as had the Taft Vale12 case:
What startled the trade union world was that, after the
Trade Disputes Act, 1906, and more than half a century of
case law, in which the courts had shown a deepening understanding of the vital role of the trade unions in running British industry and their need to enjoy freedom of economic action to protect the legitimate interests of their members,
there still remained coiled in the common law the possibility
of an action against union officials for crushing damages and
costs for threatening strike action in the breach of contracts
of employment, whether to remove an objectionable employee - or to pursue any other industrial purpose, like a
claim in respect of wages or any other terms or conditions of
employment."
Once more Parliament was forced to intervene in order to protect unions in the exercise of their basic functions. The result
was the Trade Disputes Act, 1965.84
V.

THE DONOVAN

COMMISSION

The Rookes v. Barnard" decision followed its predecessor,
Taft Vale, into trade union lore, and served to add fuel to the
80. [1901] A.C. 426.

81. [1963] 1 Q.B. 623, 683.
82. [1901] A.C. 426.

83. C.

GRUNFELD, MODERN TRADE UNION LAW

84. Trade Disputes Act, 1965, c. 16.
85. [1964] A.C. 1129.

439 (1966).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

fires of industrial conflict in British industrial relations during
the 1960's. That conflict was evidenced by the rising incidence
of unofficial or "wildcat" strikes, flagrant breaches of collective agreements and general disorder in the collective bargaining system."8 A Royal Commission"7 was established in
1965 to examine and recommend changes in the British system of industrial relations. This commission, popularly
termed the "Donovan Commission," was the fifth Royal Commission set up to enquire into British industrial relations since
1867. Previous commission reports had resulted in some modifications of the system, particularly in the legislative sphere,
but only on a piecemeal basis.u The difference with Donovan
however, lay in the range and scope of its field of enquiry;
nothing less than a full-scale revision of the entire system was
envisaged.89 The Commission, with this end in mind, received
a staggering amount of evidence and testimony from unions,
employers and the government."' It observed that Britain had
two systems of industrial relations, which it termed the formal
and informal. The formal system assumes that national or industry-wide agreements, drawn up between representative unions and employers' associations, apply and are honored in
each of the business undertakings .they cover. Reality, though,
favors the informal system whereby factory management and
local branches of national unions negotiate terms and conditions which make national or industry-wide agreements a
mere starting point for local additions. The formal system,
86. H. PELLING, supra note 21, at 267.
87. ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION (1965-68)
H.M.S.O. CMND 3623; [hereinafter referred to as Donovan Report].
88. For legislative developments, see generally, B. HEPPLE & P. O'HIGGINS, supra
note 4, at 3-39.
89. Donovan Report, supra note 87, at 11: "It may fairly be said therefore that as
a Royal Commission we have been sitting at a time when the basic principles of our
system of industrial relations are in question."
90. Id. at 319:
[W]e received a considerable volume of written evidence. Memoranda were received from Government Departments, the Trade Union Congress, the Confederation of British Industry, numerous trade unions and employers' associations,
companies, nationalised industries, organizations connected with industrial relations, individuals having specialist knowledge of the subject, and members of
the public. In all some 430 organizations, persons or groups of persons sent us
written submissions.
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then, is a relic of the past, hindering an already developed
movement toward local bargaining and agreements, while
keeping the trappings of national or industry-wide bargaining."
Britain, therefore, has local unions which deal with local
management in much the same manner as their American
counterparts, but this has never been acknowledged by unions
and employers' associations at the national level, so that:
"The informal system is founded on reality, recognizing that
organizations on both sides of industry are not strong. Central
trade union organization is weak, and employers' associations
are weaker." 2 The lack of strong central union authority goes
some way toward explaining why Britain is plagued by unofficial or wildcat strikes."'
The Donovan Commission recommended many changes in
the British system. Among them were proposals for the reform of the collective bargaining system in order to bring the
formal system into accord with industrial realities and to
bring greater order to the informal system. The report envisaged the introduction of factory-wide agreements to develop
the informal system and the confinement of industry-wide
agreements to such areas as they might effectively cover." If
91. Id. at 36:
The formal and informal systems are in conflict. The informal system un-

dermines the regulative effect of industry-wide agreements. The gap between
industry-wide agreed rates and actual earnings continues to grow. Procedure
agreements fail to cope adequately with disputes arising within factories. Nevertheless, the assumptions of the formal system still exert a powerful influence
over men's minds and prevent the informal system from developing into an

effective and orderly method of regulation.
92. Id. at 12.

93. Id. at ch. 8 passim, see further at 261:
The bargaining which takes place within factories is largely outside the control of employer's associations and trade unions. It usually takes place piecemeal and results in competitive sectional wage adjustments and chaotic sectional wage adjustments and chaotic pay structures. Unwritten understandings
and "customs and practice" predominate.
These developments help to explain why resort to unofficial and unconstitutional strikes and other forms of workshop pressure has been increasing.
94. Id. at 261-67 passim.
95. Id. at 262-63:

Factory-wide agreements can, however, provide the remedy. Factory agreements (with company agreements as an alternative in multi-plant companies)
can regulate actual pay, constitute a factory negotiating committee and griev-

ance procedures which suit the circumstances, deal with such subjects as re-
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the informal system was to be a rational and stable alternative
for Britain, it became obvious that major and far-reaching
changes in the law were necessary. The British Labor Party,
then in power, set out its proposals for reform in its White
Paper (a Government Consultative Document) entitled "In
Place of Strife-A Policy for Industrial Relations."9 It advocated cautious changes, in general, based partly upon the
Donovan Report and partly upon political realities, i.e., the
British Labor Party receives substantial funding from the
trade union movement.97 The stance of the British Conservative Party, however, was much more radical. In its consultative paper entitled "A Fair Deal at Work,"98 it advocated
sweeping changes based largely on the American system of
collective bargaining and labor law. The Conservatives won an
unexpected political victory99 in the general election of 1970
and, in August, 1971, their government succeeded in passing
through Parliament the first British attempt at comprehensive
statutory reform of the industrial relations sphere, the Industrial Relations Act, 1971.1 °° This statute, in 170 sections, introduced many concepts heretofore totally unknown to British
employers and unions, e.g., bargaining units, bargaining
agents and agency shops. It also .required, for the first time,
that all written collective agreements entered into after the
commencement of the Act be conclusively presumed to be legally binding on the parties unless stipulated to the contrary. 1 1 This measure provided a supreme example of the British propensity for compromise. The Conservative Government
was undoubtedly aware of the problems that would inevitably
have followed from the direct imposition of legal enforceability
upon British collective agreements, and therefore allowed emdundancy and discipline and cover the rights and obligations of shop stewards.
A factory agreement can assist company managers, many current industrywide agreements have become a hinderance to them.
96. IN PLACE OF STrF-E-A POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL RLATmIONS, H.M.S.O. CMND.
3888 (1969).
97. Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 48, § 4; see also H. PELLNo, supra note
21, at 133-48.

98. A Fair Deal at Work, Conservative Political Centre Publication (1969).
99. Unexpected, that is, because Gallup pollsters and the like had predicted a
landslide victory for the Labor Party.
100. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, c. 72 (repealed 1974).
101. Id. at § 34.
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ployers and unions an escape route to follow if they wished.
The Government had hoped that legal enforcement of labor
contracts would eventually prove as acceptable in Britain as it
had become in the United States. Unfortunately though, this
escape clause was taken advantage of so avidly that legally
enforceable agreements became the exception rather than the
rule.' 2 It was the unions' belief that if the agreements could be
enforced legally, they would again be at the mercy of the
03
courts which had historically supported employers.
The unions were implacably opposed to the Act from its
very inception and the Trades Union Congress (T.U.C.), the
British counterpart of the AFL-CIO, led a concerted campaign
for its immediate repeal.' 4 Some trade unions tried to secure
some of the advantages of the Act by registering; a union
which did not register was termed simply an "organization of
workers" and did not enjoy most of the Act's major advantages. The T.U.C. responded by requiring its member unions
not to register or use the machinery of the Act, except in
purely defensive roles; any union which had registered was ordered to take positive steps to deregister. The 1972 T.U.C.
suspended thirty-two unions for failing to deregister, and
twenty more were expelled at the 1973 Congress.' 5 Employers,
on the other hand, found the Act totally irrelevant since most
unions with which they had to deal were unregistered anyway
and thus could not have access to those parts of the Act which
might have furthered union-employer relationships.' 6 There
were those who believed the legislation had some beneficial
side effects, however. For example, many companies, some for
102. B. CooPER & A. BARTLErr, supra note 27, at 119:
All written collective agreements made after the commencement of the Act
were presumed to be legally enforceable contracts unless the parties stipulated
otherwise . . . . However, the parties continued to express the wish for collective agreements to be binding in honour only; therefore, a great deal of legal
energy was expended on drawing up non-enforceability clauses - popularly
termed TINA LEA (This Is Not A Legally Enforceable Agreement).
103. J. GuFrrH, supra note 32, at 57 passim.
104. For discussion of historical reasons for union antagonism toward the judiciary
and preference for collective bargaining between trade unions and employers over legislation, see B. HEPPLE AND P. O'HIGGINS, supra note 88, at 3; and H. PELU1,
POPULAR PoLrrxcs AND SocIETY ch. 4 (1968).
105. INCOMES DATA SERVICES; Brief 21, Sept. 1973, at 2.
106. Lloyd, Last Act, J. INDUS. Soc'Y, June 1974, at 10.
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the very first time, were forced to examine their industrial relations policies in order to conform to the Act's requirements. °7 The Labor Party returned to power in the 1974 general election and, in keeping with one of the planks of its party
platform, duly repealed the Industrial Relations Act, 1971,
with the passage of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act,
1974.10° The new Act resurrected some provisions of the old,'10
especially in the area of individual rights, but some measures
such as bargaining agents and agency shops were not brought
back. The position of the 1971 Act on collective agreements
was completely reversed. With the commencement of the 1974
Act, all collective agreements were to be presumed nonenforceable at law unless they were made in writing and the parties had expressly stipulated that they wished to be legally
bound."10 Thus, Britain's one and only attempt at comprehensive legislative reform of its industrial relations system and labor law is now nothing but another unhappy memory in trade
union history.
VI. ACCEPTANCE AND REmJCEION: THE MoTVE FORCES
Many different factors operated to provide the United
States with both the opportunities and the willingness to
make its system of industrial relations and labor law work,
and an entire complex of factors militated against British emulation of the American success story. America's giant industrial unions were forming when the Wagner Act"' started to
take effect; not only were they not hostile to the Act - they
welcomed it as, indeed, many owed their very existence to its
107. Elliot, The Case for Voluntary Labor Relations, Financial Times, Oct. 2,
1972:
In general most employers in almost all industries managed to continue their
voluntary arrangements without recourse to the law. But many employers
would also argue that the very existence of the law had an effect in various
small but significant ways. They would argue that unions and shop stewards
became more careful about giving proper advance notice of industrial action
and that some procedure agreements have been more easily reformed than
would have been possible without the law.
108. Trade Union and Labor Relations Act, 1974, c. 52.
109. Id. at schedule 1.
110. Id. at § 18.
111. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976)).
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provisions."12 The Act was saved from the path taken by its
later, unfortunate British counterpart by the determined
stance of the Roosevelt administration, which served to persuade the Supreme Court of the wisdom in not destroying the
legislation on constitutional grounds.13 The landmark Jones &
Laughlin decision"' saved the Wagner Act from the fate of the
National Industrial Recovery Act."' Britain's Conservative
Government was as determined to make its 1971 Act work,
but the unions which it faced were mature, settled institutions
who felt their vested interests threatened. In the United
States, however, both the fledgling CIO unions and the mature AFL unions welcomed the Wagner Act."6 Their experience with the courts did not coincide with the experience of
British unions. In fact, judicial interpretations under the Sherman Antitrust Act during the 1940's were supportive of organized labor."'
Many British unions are older than their American counterparts, and so when they were engaging in many of their
early struggles they were faced with a hostile and unrepresentative Parliament." ' But faced with a hostile judiciary, they
had little option save resort to the legislature for redress of
their problems. At first such resort involved making representations to the radical element in the Liberal Party, which had
learned the value of the working-class vote. Eventually an alliance of many unions and socialist bodies produced the Labor
112. E. BFAL, E. WicKmSHAm, & P. KmNAsT, THE P CAcCE OF CoLLnmva BAR-

ch. 5 passim (1976).
113. R. CORTNER, THE WAGNER Acr CASES 150-55 (1964).
114. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
115. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). The NIRA was
declared unconstitutional in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
116. H. WELLINGTON, supra note 38, at 189-90: "The ideal must be pursued by
union leaders, and it is not when union leaders are shown to be uninterested in the
quest, there is a shock of betrayal and a demand for reform, which often means for
law."
117. E.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
118. See, e.g., S. MEAcH AN, A LIFE APAR - THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS, 18901914, at 205-07 (1977).
The uncertainty and frustrations of party politics resulted in many cases in a
general revulsion against Parliament as well, an institution apparently
designed, like the law, by a ruling class for its own particular ends. . . . The
ways of party and Parliament were not the ways of the working men.
Id. at 206.
GAINING,
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Representation Committee in 1900. This organization became
the Labor Party in 1906"1 and British unions to this day have
a political party. While it is by no means their own, the Labor
Party relies on the union movement for a large portion of its
funding.' This ability to pressure its favored party when it is
in government is in direct contrast to the American labor
movement which must resort only to indirect pressure and
lobbying tactics even when the Democrats, their favorite
party, are in power. 2' If the American labor movement had
had a party of its own in 1947 it might have been successful in
defeating the Taft-Hartley Act 2 2 but, as it turned out, even
cooperative political lobbying and campaigning between the
AFL and CIO were unsuccessful.1r American unions, lacking a
direct political influence, have therefore learned to live with
labor laws. American labor bases its approach to collective
bargaining on what it terms "business unionism,' ' 24 which
stresses collective bargaining issues in a primarily economic
vein rather than in a political or ideological manner. Both the
term and the concept would seem strange to British unions,
which sometimes undertake concerted action against a particular government, 12 a phenomenon from which the Labor Party
itself is by no means immune. A legislative body can afford to
take a more objective and sometimes unpopular stance than
can employers or unions, but this is not true when it is di119. B. COOPER & A. BARTLETT, supra note 27, at 12.
120. For discussion of the challenge to trade unions' support of a political party in
1909, see H. PELLING, supra note 21, at 130-32. See also Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6
Edw. 7, c. 48, § 4.
121. That is not to say that union leaders are without tremendous influence over
the American public; see, e.g., S. LENS, supra note 40, at 375:
In criticizing Franklin Roosevelt for failing to come to the aid of the Little Steel
strikers, John L. Lewis on Labor Day 1937, told a nationwide audience: "Those
who chant their praises of democracy but who lost no chance to drive their
knives into labor's defenseless back must feel the weight of labor's woes even as
its open adversaries must ever feel the thrust of labor's power.
Labor, like Israel, has many sorrows. Its women weep for their fallen and
they lament for the future of the children of the race."
For a thorough discussion of unions and political power, see H. WELLINGTON, supra
note 38, at 215-38.
122. See A. GOLDBERG, AFL-CIO: LABOR UNITED 9-11 (1956) (detailing America's
unions rejecting a political party of their own).
123. Id. at 203-07.
124. M. EsTEY, THE UNIONS 77 (1976).
125. See H. PELLING, supra note 21, at 281-84.
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rectly influenced by one of the interested parties. Therefore,
the British Labor Party, faced with the hostility of the trade
union movement and the indifference of employers toward the
Industrial Relations Act, 1971,26 had little choice but to promise repeal of the Act in return for union support in its electoral
efforts.'1

VII. ARBITRATION AND THE CoLLECmVE BARGAINING SYSTEM
The Taft-Hartley Act' 21 provided, inter alia, for the legal
enforcement of collective agreements as contracts, in section
301(a).129 This section was faced with constitutional challenges
initially, but was eventually upheld in the Lincoln Mills decision in 1957.10 This vital section together with this crucial decision gave the American industrial relations system a marked
advantage over the British approach. Not only are American

collective agreements given a valuable legal underpinning, but
also a robust labor arbitration'system was permitted to flour-

ish. ' Though labor arbitration would remedy the chief causes
of British "unofficial" or wildcat strikes,' 312 it remains out of
reach to the British. It is firmly established in British labor
relations that unions do not like resort to the courts,'33 yet,
126. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, c. 72 (repealed 1974).
127. H. PELLING, supra note 21, at 283.
128. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 29, 50 U.S.C. (1976)).
129. Id. at ch. 120, § 301(a) (29 U.S.C. § 185(a)):
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
130. Textile Workers' Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
131. Labor arbitration is provided for in approximately 94% of collective agreements; see U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ARBITRATION PROcDUREs 5, Bulletin No. 1425 (1966).
132. Donovan Report, supra note 87, at 100:
[A]bout half of all unofficial strikes - 1,052 a year - concern wages ....
[Alfter wages, the next most prolific immediate causes of dispute are working
arrangements, rules and discipline (646 or 29% of the total) and redundancy,
dismissal, suspension, etc. (326 or 15% of the total). These are matters which
are usually dealt with at the workplace and not at industry level; the prevalence of stoppages due to these causes is a reflection on the adequacy of the
procedures available to settle them.
133. K. WEDDERBURN, supra note 14, at 13: "Most workers want nothing more of
the law than that it should leave them alone. In this they can be said to display an
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were they to enjoy a sophisticated grievance arbitration system as their American counterparts do, they would have a
speedy and informal means of grievance adjustment without
the necessity for court intervention. Labor arbitiation in the
United States has received considerable judicial encouragement in its -development; 34 similar judicial support and encouragement in Britain would be highly unlikely from the
court that decided the Rookes v. Barnard35 case.
Arbitration machinery has been available for some time in
Britain by law under such statutes as the Conciliation Act,
1895,136 and the Industrial Courts Act, 1919.137 However, resort
to the process has been minimal, as indicated by the written
evidence of the Ministry of Labor to the Donovan Commission. 3' There is little support for arbitration in the private sector, but some in the public sector.3 9 Labor arbitration in the
United States often aids the parties in drawing up the provisions of their contracts to cover deficiencies revealed by the
arbitration award. 40 British arbitrators, however, traditionally
render awards without giving the reasons for arriving at their
conclusions.' On first inspection then, it would appear that
employers and unions in Britain have been deprived of a valuable aid to contract administration. It must be emphasized,
instinct that is fundamental to British Industrial relations."
134. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960):
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the courts;
the considerations which help him fashion judgments may indeed be foreign to
the competence of Courts ...
. . .For the parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily
to further their common goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement,
to make the agreement serve their specialized needs. The ablest judge cannot
be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the
determination of a grievance because he cannot be properly informed.
See also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
135. [1964] A.C. 1129.
136. 59 & 60 Vict., c. 30 (1896).
137. 9 & 10 Geo. V, c. 69 (1919).
138. Donovan Report, supra note 87, at 111.
139. H. CLEGG, THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS iN GREAT BRrrAIN 212-13
(1972).
140. H. WELLINGTON, supra note 38, at 91-125.
141. Written Evidence of the Ministry of Labor to the Royal Commission on Trade
Unions and Employers' Associations 101-06 (1965-68).
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however, that a large portion of what passes for arbitration in
Britain concerns what is known in the United States as "interest" arbitration, i.e., arbitration over what the terms of a contract should be, as opposed to "rights" or "grievance" arbitration which involves interpretation or application of an already
agreed contract.4 2 In the United States, the overwhelming
bulk of arbitration proceedings involves grievance or rights arbitration,"' while the British rarely distinguish between the
two concepts at all.'" The Conservative Party, -while in government, hoped that among other measures, employers and
unions would resort more to conciliation and arbitration, and
they recommended that both parties should regard themselves
as being bound by arbitrators' awards.4 5 The Trades Union
Congress did not look kindly upon the prospect of arbitration
as a means of resolving disputes, preferring instead the machinery of negotiation."'
The Labor Party, upon its return to power in 1974, stressed
the strengthening of free collective bargaining and proposed to
establish a Conciliation and Arbitration Service to aid in the
resolution of disputes and to provide assistance and advisory
services to both employers and unions."' Like its American
counterpart, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
it was required to maintain -lists of arbitrators for use by the
parties when requested. It was initially set up on an adminis-

142. F. ELOUi & E. ELKouiu, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 47 (3d ed. 1974).
143. H. WELLINGTON, supranote 38, at 94-95: "Ninety-six percent of collective bargaining agreements today provide for some form of grievance arbitration."
144. Id. at 44:
The distinction is not at present important in Britain because most collective
agreements lay down minimum standards which are improved and elaborated
on by further negotiation at subsidiary levels. Moreover shopfloor agreements
are closely linked with customs and practices which are not set down in any
agreement, so that at this level no clear distinction exists between disputes of
right and disputes of interest.
145. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CODE OF PRACICE (1972), H.M.S.O., at 27:
Independent conciliation and arbitration can be used to settle all types of disputes if the parties concerned agree that they should. Arbitration by the Industrial Arbitration Board or other independent arbitrators is particularly suitable
for settling disputes of right, and its wider use for that purpose is desirable.
Where it is used the parties should undertake to be bound by the award.
146. TRADE UNION CONGRESS, GOOD INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS - A GUIDE FOR NEGOTIATIONS (1971), at 15: "[I]tmust be recognized that an excessive reliance on arbitration
can weaken the effectiveness of the negotiating procedures in resolving disputes."
147. See B. HEPPLE & P. O'HIGGIns, supra note 4, at 69-73.
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trative basis in September, 1974,148 and established on a statutory footing in 1975.11 Whereas the provision for advice in the
field of industrial relations and personnel management came
to be a major part of its work, the new service changed its
name to that of the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service.' The main thrust of its work, however, still consists of
conciliation rather than arbitration.' This lack of resort to arbitration in the resolution of disputes reflects not only the parties' indifference to the process, but also a basic weakness of
the British collective bargaining system:
When collective bargaining has been reformed, however, and
companies negotiate comprehensive and effective agreements, the parties may conclude that their arrangements
would be strengthened by providing for arbitration on all unresolved differences relating to the application of the agreement during its currency (which might be for a fixed51 2term)
with voluntary acceptance of the awards as binding.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The British system of industrial relations and labor law
lends itself readily to historical, if not logical, analysis. The
outside observer, particularly one looking from the standpoint
of the American system, might be tempted to despair. Without a doubt it is impossible to paint an attractive picture of
the present British situation in the hope of thus lifting that
despair. And unless we are to consign the entire future of the
British nation to mindless industrial anarchy and chaos, we
must pursue the search for solutions. Clearly, employers and
unions in that country are not enamoured of sweeping comprehensive reform, yet it is evident that the gradualist approach
leaves much undone that is in need of pressing reform. Perhaps a more effective way of shaping the future course of legis148.
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152. Donovan Report, supra note 87, at 121.

vol. LXXXIII, No. 9, September
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lative intervention might be to draw up a list of required reforms as if we had a blank check and a chance to start all over
again without the horrendous web of complexity which the history of the British system has spun. Prospective reformers
would, of course, be somewhat limited in that we have only
the experience of other systems to follow. Perhaps examples
might be gleaned from Scandinavia with its laudable consultation and cooperation at all levels." 3 Relying on these systems alone, unfortunately, would leave little to proceed with
when we returned to reality because the historical legacy of
British labor law does not bode well for consultation and cooperation. The West German system with its remarkable worker
participation might give us some direction. However, worker
participation works well in that country because management
wishes it on one hand, and, on the other, there are only sixteen unions covering the entire work force. These unions are
responsible and authoritative ones that try very hard to make
their system work. 54 A major restructuring of British unions
along these lines would be impossible, given the numerous unions 5 5 of Britain and their respective interests.
The quest for solutions would inevitably lead back to the
153. List, In Sweden the Byword is Cooperation,in WoRKERS' CONTROL 164 (1973):
But the big difference between Sweden and North America is that, in the Scandinavian country, compromise is preferred by labor and management to conflict, and reason to emotion. Unions are fully accepted as equal partners in the
Swedish economy and labor has responded by a display of responsibility unmatched in North America. In Sweden, the byword is cooperation.
Labor violence is unknown, picketing is a rarity, wildcat strikes are almost
nonexistent and both unions and management have a respect for each other
seldom found in Canada. It is almost the idyllic state in terms of industrial
relations. Sweden is one of the world's most highly developed industrial countries, yet the stability of its labor relations sets it apart from other developed
lands.
Id. at 165.
154. WEST GRMAN TRADE UNION FEDFATION, Co-DMMUNAToN IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIc Op GERMANY, reprinted in WoaERS' CONTROL 194 (1973).

155. Donovan Report, supra note 87, at 7:
At the beginning of the present century there were 1,323 trade unions with a
membership of 2,022,000 workers ....
At the end of 1966 there were 574 trade
unions with a total membership of 10,111,000 ... out of the total of 574 unions
170 are affiliated to the Trades Union Congress ... but these unions between
them have a total membership of nearly 9 million employees.
By 1973 there were, mainly as a result of amalgamations, 495 unions in Britain. See
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT GAzurrE, vol. LXXXII, No. 11, November [1974], at
1017. But they had a combined membership of 11,507,000.
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United States. Having once shared a common legal system
there might be some things left that both labor law systems
might share. British and American unions have felt that brunt
of judicial hostility in the past and both have been permitted
to develop, though in different ways, by means of statutory
intervention. The fate of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971,155
makes it clear that there cannot be a wholesale importation of
American labor law into the British system. However, the major change recommended in the Donovan Report, that local
agreements be constructed to deal with local matters and national agreements be confined to national matters, is already
the norm in the United States.157 Restructuring British agreements raises the question of their legal enforceability. Although legal enforcement was rejected outright by employers
and unions in Britain, two things must be borne in mind.
First, unlike section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, ' Section
34 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971,'19 its British counterpart, permitted the parties to avoid legal enforceability. Second, the Act did not last long enough for the parties to become
accustomed to legally enforceable agreements. Andrew Shonfield, in his note of reservation to the Donovan Commission
stated: "Instead of making it complicated and difficult for unions to enter into contractual obligations which are enforceable at law, so that it has become an eccentric thing for a union
to do, unions and employers should be encouraged to treat it
1 60
as the normal thing to do."
Legally enforceable agreements would then pave the way
for a system of grievance arbitration, which would serve to reduce Britain's "unofficial" strike problem. 61' A grievance arbitration system would also help in inducing the move toward
more local agreements. If each new local agreement incorporated an arbitration clause, employees would then have the
opportunity to consider peaceful alternatives to the wildcat
strike and, hopefully, grievance arbitration would become the

156. 1971, § 44 c. 72 (repealed 1974).
157. A. SLOA AND F. WrrNEY, LABOR RELATIONS 173 (3d ed. 1977).
158. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 29, 50 U.S.C. (1976)).
159. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, c. 72, § 34 (repealed 1974).
160. Donovan Report, supra note 87, at 300.
161. Gould, A Substitute for Striking, NEw SocmrY, August 2, 1973, at 275-77.
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rule rather than the exception. These proposals could not be
considered a wholesale incorporation of American labor law,
and thus they might escape the fate of the Industrial Relations
Act, 1971.62 Given the history of judicial hostility to unions in
Britain such a system of arbitration could only be acceptable
to unions if judicial review of arbitration is expressly excluded,
as evidenced in the United States by the Steelworkers Trilogy.16 3 It would be unthinkable even today to expect the British bench and bar to adopt a policy of judicial abnegation similar to the United States Supreme Court in the Steelworkers
Trilogy, and the curtailment of judicial review would, of necessity, be in the form of legislation. Thus, although the
sweeping attempt at incorporation of American labor law concepts failed in Britain in 1971, it is still possible to envisage
the use of aspects of American labor law. After all, the American system does curb wildcat activity by offering alternative
devices while insulating labor unions from a hostile judiciary.
Therein lies the seed of a meaningful lesson for the intelligent
and cautious use of legislative intervention in Britain.

162. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, c. 72 (repealed 1974).
163. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).

